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Abstract 
In the last two decades, international institutions, donors, academics are interested in budgetary transparency that promotes public 
access to information about budgets, government policies and financial activities of governments in order to make them accessible 
to citizens. Social reformers promote the idea that a high score of open budget index is the main incentive to influence policymakers 
to adopt policies to reliably optimize public finances. Based on data from the literature we developed a multiple regression model 
in panel (during 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012) and we have examined the links between corruption control (CC), which is the level at 
which public power is exercised over private gain, and got a very strong causal relationship, which budgetary transparency, as 
measured by Open Budget Index, and economic performance, as measured by the GDP per capita. Over 50 % of the variation of 
the dependent variable, the (CC) is explained by the independent variables, budgetary transparency (OBI) and GDP per capita. The 
independent variables OBI and GDP per capita have a positive and significant effect on the level of corruption control in all 
countries. The central argument of the empirical study shows that high budget transparency scores determine both reducing of 
corruption and also improves government policies as well as providing vital information to the public. 
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1. Introduction 
In an economy in recession, public expenditure has been transformed into a research field, and transparency has 
become a key principle for the management of economic performance. Citizens have a right to know how governments 
manage public resources, this being stated and known for a very long time.  
Since 350 B.C., Aristotle said that “... in order to protect the treasury from being cheated, is to allow funds to be 
released openly in front of the whole city and copies of the accounts to be stored in various guaranteed locations” 
(Shah, 2007, quoted by Renzio and Masud, 2011). In the early 20th-century, Sundelson stated that: ”the budget is not 
the budget unless it allows free and unlimited intrusions from the public into all its structures” (Sundelson, 1935, 
quoted by Renzio and Masud, 2011).  
Budgetary transparency has become an integral part of the public sector, and systematic evaluation and 
measurement is a recent phenomenon. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and OECD have 
developed extensive questionnaires and diagnostic tools to examine the budgetary transparency and budgetary 
practices and procedures (World Bank, 2003, IMF, 2007, OECD, 2001, quoted by Badun, 2009).  
Budgetary transparency promotes public access to information about public expenditure and financial activities of 
the governments. The more budgetary transparency is higher, the more is improved the governance management by 
enhancing the government’s responsibilities, providing vital information to the public and reducing corruption. 
Transparency of governmental operations is regarded as an important precondition for a sustainable economy, good 
governance and a general budgetary rectitude (Kopits and Craig, 1998). The basic principle which arises from the 
existing researches is that there are circumstances in which a country's government may hold information, economic, 
financial or political, but deliberately decide not to provide information to the public. 
For example, if presented economic information states that the government does not have a satisfactory activity, it 
would not provide this information (or at least would "soften" the data). In other situations, it might be a kind of 
“neglect”, whereby information is not necessarily detained, but the collection and dissemination of information has a 
low priority, and thus the same result occurs, the public is not able to take economic decisions due to lack of 
information (or misleading makes the existing information of very poor quality).  
When discussing about transparency, most authors relate to its role to act as a responsibility mechanism regarding 
the behavior of public officials. Here, the information itself is not necessarily important, but rather the manner in which 
the potential release of information determines the economic operators “to do the right thing”. And such transparency 
is often quite closely related to the problem of corruption, as regards the transparency is seen as a vital tool in helping 
reducing the corrupt and illegal benefits gained from the producer conduct (Brunetti and Weder, 2003). 
Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the emphasis in this area was specifically on aspects of:  
 the importance of having a free media to expose any illegal or inappropriate behavior from civil servants; 
 the government's attitude and actions towards responsibility. 
The theoretical literature on the relationships between a free media and transparency, generally, revolves around a 
type of analysis of the main agent (Besley and Prat, 2006; Besley and Burgess, 2002; Prat, 2006) where, with the 
existence of asymmetric information between the government and the citizen, a free press can play its role in making 
the governments to meet the needs of its citizens. Previous models can be found in the Persson and Tabellini (2000) 
and their “career pursuits” model in which the agent (the politician) would want a credible signal for the decisional 
factor (citizens) regarding what type of politician he is, and thus being re-elected. The press, essentially, can act as a 
checking way about what kind of politician it is, because the politician’s actions itself are not credible. 
Empirical evidences for this are relatively strong. For example, in an influential publication, Besley and Burgess 
(2001) are using the example of Indian states between 1958 and 1992 in order to observe the correlation between the 
degree of media freedom in each state and the ability of their government's response to the food shortages. They noted 
a very clear link between press freedom and the government's response to the food shortages. Djankov et al. (2003) 
have built an indicator of assumed by the media to demonstrate that if the media is state-owned, it is associated with 
less freedom of the press, civil and political rights, as well with weaker social results.  
Therefore, this paper highlights the importance of a free and independent media. 
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As pointed out by Weil (2008), the corrupt officials would be able to squander public funds, for example, through 
the award of contracts to private operators who pay the highest bribes rather than to those who are more efficient, or 
by putting taxes collected directly into their own pockets. Corruption takes many forms, such as bribes paid to 
government officials, public contracts for marketing money, and embezzlement of public funds. As such, it is now 
widely accepted that government corruption is a serious obstacle for improving the transparency of the budgetary and 
economic development. 
Transparency and the right to access government information are now regarded worldwide as essential for 
democracy, trust in the government, corruption prevention, making decisions on the basis of information, accuracy of 
information, the provision of government information by the public, companies and journalists, among other essential 
functions in society (Cullier and Piotrowski, 2009; Mulgan, 2007; Quinn, 2003; Reylea, 2009; Shuler et al., 2010; 
Bertot et al., 2010).  
The World Bank considers corruption as an action that is realized when the officials are using their power in a 
private interest. Corruption is a phenomenon encountered in both developed and developing countries. Beginning with 
Mauro (1995) many empirical studies (e.g. Svensson (2005), Asiedu and Freeman, 2009, Neanidis and Haque, 2009) 
have demonstrated that corruption can reduce the economical growth, the investments and the budgetary transparency.  
Corruption has both political and economic valences. The literature reveals that bureaucrats need high salaries to 
reduce corruption. An important topic in economics becomes the relation between the size of government and its 
inefficiency (GB Kotera, K. Okada and S. Samreth, 2012).  
In our study, we intend to examine, with an econometric model, the budgetary transparency and GDP per capita 
influence on the control of corruption and to promote the improvement of the quantity and quality of the published 
information for the population and business activities, as well that the decreasing of the government’s corruption is a 
sine qua non condition for a sustainable and transparent economy.   
2. The evolution of budgetary transparency as measured by the open budget index (OBI), during the period 
2006-2012 
The OBI information helps identifying the simple steps that governments and other actors would be able to carry 
out in order to enhance the budgetary transparency. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) and the 
International Budget Partenership (IBP) collaborates with civil society around the world in order to use the budgetary 
analysis and acts as a tool to improve the efficiency of governance and to alleviate the poverty. The Ford Foundation, 
the Open Society Institute, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and England's Department for International 
Development has provided the funding for the initiative of the Open Budget Index (OBI). IBP and CBPP are not 
affiliated with and do not receive funds from the U.S. Government (www.openbudgetindex.com). IBP is a non-
governmental organization which seeks to “contribute to the reforms concerning how governments worldwide manage 
public funds” (Heald, 2012). According to CBPP, transparency means that everyone in the country may access 
information on how much is allocated for different types of expenditure, how are collected the revenues and how they 
are used, the international donors assistance and other public resources.  
OBI is a tool that documents the budgetary transparency of the states around the world, providing useful data that 
are used both for research purposes and for transparency in decision-making. Calculated at every two years since 2006, 
OBI began to provide interesting comparative evidence about information that governments make available to the 
public on how they manage the public finances (Renzio and Masud, 2011). 
This tool is based on a detailed questionnaire intended to collect comparative data about the public availability on 
information about budget and other budgetary accounting practices for 59 countries in 2006, for 85 countries in 2008, 
for 94 countries in 2010 and for 100 countries in 2012.  
We realize a descriptive analysis in Eviews 7 program of the 59 countries for which it has been calculated the OBI 
in 2006, for the period 2006-2012, (Figure 1). In the descriptive analysis we look for the indicators related to the 
general distributions of characteristics: minimum value, maximum value, amplitude, arithmetic mean, standard 
deviation, coefficient of asymmetry (Skewness) and flattening coefficient (Kurtosis).  
For example, to observe the symmetry of the distribution from which the data series is used, we will analyze the 
estimated value for Skewness, the statistical parameter that measures the lack of symmetry, a value close to 0 indicating 
the existence of a normal distributions of data series examined, while values significantly different from 0 (positive or 
582   Maria Violeta Cimpoeru and Valentin Cimpoeru /  Procedia Economics and Finance  27 ( 2015 )  579 – 586 
negative) reflects the degree of remoteness from the normal distribution. Similarly, the Kurtosis indicator says whether 
the elements of a series are close together or apart of the normal distribution. A high value indicates that data series 
has a distinct peak versus average. The statistical test Jarque-Bera is used as a tie between these two statistical 
indicators and measures the degree of approximation of normality. For the OBI data series, we statistically analyze 
and we obtain: maximum value: 93, minimum value: 48,61, average: 50, standard deviation: 22,37. The asymmetry 
coefficient value is close to 0, indicating the existence of a close to normal distributions of data series analyzed (-
0,214). Kurtotica has a smaller value than 3 (2,56), the distribution being easily platycurtotic (has a lower peak 
compared to a normal distribution) (Figure 1). 
Fig. 1. Histogram of OBI data series (2006-2012) - (distribution closer to normal) 
 
The study conducted by Renzo and Masud (2011) on the OBI evolution highlights two distinct patterns: 
 global average levels of budgetary transparency are worryingly low, and in many countries, the governments 
publish a limited number of budgetary information available to the population;  
 these levels are slowly improved and there have been a number of cases in which the budgetary transparency has 
improved drastically.   
Yet further efforts are required to deepen the understanding of the factors that could explain why some governments 
are more transparent than others, as well as the potential benefits of improving budgetary transparency (Renzo and 
Masud, 2011). 
The OBI survey assigns each country a score based on the media of the 92 answers - (questionnaires in 2006, 2008, 
and 2010) related to the availability for the public of the information in the questionnaires. This score reflects the 
amount of budgetary information publicly available in the eight key budgetary documents, namely: the pre budget, 
the budget proposal, the adopted budget, the citizen’s budget, the multiannual report, the semester report, the final 
report and the audit report.  
The study conducted by Renzo and Masud (2011) treats the problem of transparency as a key aspect of the 
governance systems and stresses out the need for discovering more effective ways to manage and measure it. OBI is 
a useful complement to existing instruments, thanks to rigorous methodology, independence and comparability. 
Budgetary transparency provides detailed information regarding the transparency of the budgetary systems in a wide 
range of countries and follows their progress over time through OBI 2006, OBI 2008 and OBI 2010. Civil society 
groups from a number of countries, with the IBP assistance, use the survey results to engage discussions with their 
government and demand improvements in their scores of budgetary transparency. In some cases, as the survey points 
out, there are very simple and cheap solutions that governments might adopt, such as publication of the documents 
they produce for their internal use on the web sites. How the survey now went into the fourth round, some additional 
aspects are taken into account, such as how to move beyond a narrow focus on the provision of information about the 
budget, in order to cover the aspects related to public involvement and participation in the budget process or how to 
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incorporate additional issues of budget transparency for countries that already have good OBI scores (Renzo and 
Masud, 2011).  
Analyzing the OBI 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 surveys, we observe that only 15 from the 59 countries included in 
the OBI 2006, 20 from the 85 countries included in OBI 2008, 20 from the 94 countries included in OBI 2010 and 20 
from the 100 countries included in OBI 2012, have scores over 60% and can be characterized as countries that offers 
to their citizens sufficient budgetary data to allow a comprehensive analysis of them.  A score of less than 60% cumbers 
the citizens’ attempts to make the government accountable for the management of public resources (Figure 2). 
OBI assesses budgetary transparency of national or federal governments (the understanding of information relating 
to the revenues, expenditures and debts of the government), as well as information related to sustainable performance. 
IBP analysis according to the OBI score groups the countries into 5 categories, namely: the first category includes 
countries which have an OBI score between 81 to 100 (these countries publish extensive information about their 
budgets); the second category concerns the countries which have a score of approximately 61 - 80 (they publish 
important information about their budgets); the third category includes countries which have an OBI score 41 - 60 
(countries that publish some information about their budgets); the fourth category is made up of countries that have 
an OBI score between 21 - 40 (countries that publish minimum information about their budgets); and the fifth category 
concerns countries which have an OBI score between 0-20 (these countries publish truncated information, if any, 
about their budgets).  
However, the data study published in 2012 and covering 100 countries, reveals that, on average, the surrounding 
budget transparency around the world is weak. Lower income countries, weak democratic institutions and strong 
dependency of foreign aid, as well as hydrocarbon sales tend to be less transparent. However, a number of countries 
have improved the quantity and quality of budgetary information that they publish, following the pressure from the 
civil society, based on the OBI findings. 
Fig. 2. OBI evolution during 2006-2012 
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3. The influence of the determinants on the corruption control  
Brunetti and Weder (2003) examine the relations between a free press and corruption, indicating a very strong 
causal relationship, starting from a free press to a lesser corruption. Alt and Lowry (2010) conducted an empirical 
survey of U.S. states, demonstrating that budgetary process transparency determines lower elective costs for 
politicians and raised taxes. This increase in taxes is accepted by voters when they know how public resources are 
spend, thus making the re-election more likely. The results of these empirical studies have shown that transparency is 
an effective tool in supporting a sustainable management. Civil society groups used its recommendations to put 
pressure on governments to improve their budgetary transparency.   
In order to achieve the proposed objective, I used a fundamental research based on scientific literature and a 
quantitative method to collect data, based on a regression in panel model. As a first step, I've created the database with 
model variables in MS Excel, then I analyzed the data and I tested the linear dependence using Eviews 7. For the 
model with panel data I estimated regression equation for which I used, at the same time, both time series and cross-
sectional data. 
Studies in the literature have dealt with various types of indicators to assess the level of corruption, budgetary 
transparency and economic growth, but our research analyzed the impact of the following macroeconomic indicators, 
as independent variables (Open Budget Index - OBI, GDP per capita - GDP CAPITA) concerning corruption control 
(CC) - as the dependent variable.  
 OBI is a tool that documents the states’ budgetary transparency around the world, providing useful data that are 
used both for research purposes and for decision-making transparency. Calculated every two years since 2006, OBI 
began to provide interesting comparative evidence relating to information that governments shall make available to 
the public on how they manage the public finances (www.openbudget index.com). 
GDP per capita is the sum of added value by all resident producers in an economy, plus any product taxes, less the 
subsidies that are not included in the gross value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. The data are expressed in U.S. 
dollars (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.SFM.PCAP.CD). 
 Corruption control represents the level at which is exercised the public pressure over private gain, including both 
large scale and lower scale corruption and the submission of the state to the private interests (www.govindicators.org 
). 
 To determine the influence factors on the CC indicator, we started from a data set, with the following structure: 
data series necessary to estimate the model values are transversal data for a set of 59 countries, in various stages of 
economical development. This data set is characterized by a geographical heterogeneity; we take the OBI values for 
4 years, i.e. 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 (taking into account that the OBI is calculated every two years) and GDP per 
capita values for the same period, to which we add the CC values. The data set thus constructed  is a transverse one, 
more specifically each of the three above-mentioned variables is defined by two sections, a temporal one (2006-2012) 
and a geographical one (59 countries).  
The proposed hypothesis:  
H1: we introduce the hypothesis: The level of corruption control in X country is correlated positively with the level 
of budgetary transparency and GDP-per capita for that country  
A higher corruption control leads to transparency in the management of public resources and a higher level of total 
welfare (education, health, culture, security, etc.) Estimating the parameters by the method of Pooled Least Squares 
for the proposed model, which quantifies the correlation between the dependent variable (CC) and independent 
variables (OBI and GDP), we get the following formula for the regression equation (table 1). 
 
CONTROL_CORUPTION = 15.4546 + 0.4549*OBI + 0.7576*GDP_CAPITA 
 
 The determination coefficient  (0,5974) shows that the influence of the independent variables over the dependent 
variable CC is about 60%. The adjusted value of the determination coefficient (expresses the quality of the variables 
included in the model) suggests that the relevance of the information of independent variables in describing the 
dynamics of dependent variable is quite high (60%).  
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The probability of statistical F-test = 0.000 < 0.05, we can guarantee with over 95% probability that the model is 
correct specified – the model is valid. 
 
Table 1.  The results of estimation for the regression model parameters 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 2006 2012 
Periods included: 4 
Cross-sections included: 59 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 236 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 15.45466 2.671129 5.785815 0.0000 
OBI 0.454943 0.058247 7.810634 0.0000 
GDP_CAPITA 0.757639 0.082934 9.135392 0.0000 
R-squared 0.597387 Mean dependent var 44.82678 
Adjusted R-squared 0.593931 S.D. dependent var 25.44656 
S.E. of regression 16.21544 Akaike info criterion 8.422436 
Sum squared resid 61265.16 Schwarz criterion 8.466467 
Log likelihood -990.8474 Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.4401 
85 
F-statistic 172.8599 Durbin-Watson stat 0.231221 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
4. Results and discussions 
The results confirm the hypothesis set out in this research and we interpret the regression equation like this: as 
expected, the value of GDP CAPITA coefficient has a high positive impact and indicates that an increase of $ 1000 
of GDP leads to an increase with 0.75 of CC indicator; concerning the coefficient obtained for the OBI is statistically 
significant and determines a positive impact (but lower than GDP CAPITA), which means that an increase with one 
unit of it leads to an increase with 0.45 of CC indicator. 
 The validity of this model is sustained on account of low probability values (all variables are significant at a 
threshold over 95%), the value of the standard error, statistical tests applied, as well as on the basis of the determined 
report which lies at 60%.  
Statistical relationship between endogenous and exogenous variables is quite strong. In other words, 60% of the 
CC indicator variance is explained by two independent variables (budgetary transparency index and GDP per capita), 
which have a significantly positive influence over the indicator of corruption control. 
5. Conclusions 
When discussing about transparency, most authors relate to its role to act as a responsibility mechanism regarding 
the behavior of public officials. Here, the information itself is not necessarily important, but rather the manner in 
which the potential release of information determines the economic operators “to do the right thing”. And such 
transparency is often quite closely related to the problem of corruption, as regards the transparency is seen as a vital 
tool in helping reducing the corrupt and illegal benefits gained from the producer conduct.  
A simple statement in economy, although not necessarily without of controversy, is that “more information is 
always better than lesser ones”. Thus, adding transparency to the budget process is going to combat so-called 
budgetary “tricks”, in order to control the activities of the government. 
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Our research claims that rethinking policies so they meet the market demands, the countries oriented towards the 
increasing of transparency and decreasing corruption ensure themselves a healthy economic growth.  
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